VideoNuze Posts

Meanwhile, Transpera, which I wrote about previously here, is also announcing today an $8.25M Series B round, including new investor Labrador Ventures and existing investors Flybridge Capital Partners, Intel Capital and First Round Capital.

The mobile video space is earlier stage than broadband, but is coming on strong. At the recent Digital Hollywood Fall, I ran into Transpera CEO/founder Frank Barbieri, who told me that the company's phones are ringing off the hook from content providers seeking a turnkey mobile video distribution and monetization platform (recall that Transpera is both a technology provider and a mobile ad network). He explained that for now, customers are focused on the basics: getting their video out there and getting paid for it. Other more interactive features are less important, at least for now.

We touched on mobile video briefly at my two panels earlier this week. There's definite excitement, particularly in light of the iPhone's rapid acceptance. Wherever I go, people seem to accept as an inevitable that there's strong consumer appetite for mobile video. Transpera seems well-positioned to capitalize on this.

What do you think? Post a comment now.

First, apologies for those of you getting sick of me talking about the cable TV industry and broadband video; I promise this will be my last one for a while.

After attending the CTAM Summit the last couple of days, moderating two panels, attending several others and having numerous hallway chats, I've reached a conclusion: the cable industry - including operators and networks - is closing ranks to defend its traditional business model from disruptive, broadband-centric industry outsiders.

Before I explain what I mean by this and why this is happening, it's critical to understand that the cable business model, in which large operators (Comcast, Time Warner Cable, etc.) pay monthly carriage or affiliate fees to programmers (e.g. Discovery, MTV, HGTV, etc.) and then bundle these channels into multichannel packages that you and I subscribe to is one of the most successful economic formulations of all time. The cable model has proved incredibly durable through both good times and bad. In short, cable has had a good thing going for a long, long time and industry participants are indeed wise to defend it, if they can.

It's also important to know that the industry is very well ordered and as consolidation has winnowed its ranks to about half a dozen big operators and network owners, the stakes to maintain the status quo have become ever higher. All the executives at the top of these companies have been in and around the industry for years and have close personal and professional ties. There's a high degree of transparency, with key metrics like cash flow, distribution footprint, ratings and even affiliate fees all commonly understood.

One last thing that's worth understanding is that the cable industry has very strong survival instincts, or as a long-time executive is fond of saying, "Real cable people (i.e. not recent interlopers from technology, CPG or online companies that have joined the industry) were raised in caves by wolves." The fact is that the industry started humbly and experienced many very shaky moments. Yet it has managed to survive and continually re-invent itself (for those who want to know more, I refer you to "Cable Cowboy: John Malone and the Rise of the Modern Cable Business" by Mark Robichaux, still the best book on the industry's history that I've read).

All of that brings us to broadband and its potential impact on the cable model. As I've said many times, broadband's openness makes it the single most disruptive influence on the traditional video distribution value chain. Principally that means that by new players going "over the top" of cable - using its broadband pipes to reach directly into the home - cable's model is at serious risk of breaking down, once and for all.

The cable industry now gets this, and I believe has closed ranks to frown heavily on the idea of cable programming, which operators pay those monthly affiliate fees for, showing up for free on the web, or worse in online aggregators' (e.g. Hulu, YouTube, Veoh, etc.) sites. The message is loud and clear to programmers: you'll be jeopardizing those monthly affiliate fees come renewal time if your crown jewels leak out; worse, you'll be subverting the entire cable business model.

And this message isn't being delivered just by cable operators such as Peter Stern from Time Warner who said on my Broadband Video Leadership Breakfast panel that "a move to online distribution by cable networks would directly undermine the affiliate fees that are critical to creating great content." It's also coming from the likes of Discovery CEO David Zaslav who said on a panel yesterday that "there's no economic value from online distribution," and that "great brands like Discovery's must not be undervalued by making full programs available for free online."

The issue is, as a practical matter, can the industry really control all this? If there's zero online distribution, then as Fancast's impressive new head, Karin Gilford said on my panel yesterday, "pressure builds up and another channel inevitably opens" (read that as The Piracy Channel). The problem is that if, for example, an operator does put programs up on its own site - as Fancast is doing - they're available to ALL the site's visitors, not just existing cable subscribers, unless other controls are put in place like passwords, IP address authentication, geo-targeting, etc. But these are confusing and cumbersome to users whose expectations are increasingly being set by broadcasters who are making their primetime programs seamlessly available to all comers.

So what does this closing ranks suggest? Going forward, I think we'll still see cable networks putting up plenty of clips and B-roll video from their programs, maybe the occasional online premiere, some made-for-the-web stuff, paid program downloads (iTunes, etc.) and promotional/community building contests, as Deanna Brown from Scripps described with "Rate My Space" or Zaslav discussed with "MythBusters."

But when it comes to full cable network programs going online, I think that spigot's going to dry up. That has implications for online aggregators like Hulu, who will continue to have big holes in their libraries until they're ready to pay up for these carriage rights. And it also means that broadband-to-the-TV plays are also going to be hampered by subpar lineups unless these companies too are willing to pay for cable programming.

For my part, there are just too many moving parts for me to call this one just yet.

What do you think? Post a comment now!

My opening question to frame the discussion centered on broadband's eventual impact on the cable business model: does it ultimately upend the traditional affiliate fee-driven approach by enabling a raft of "over-the-top" competitors (e.g. Hulu, Netflix, Apple, YouTube, etc.) OR does it complement the model by creating new value and choice? As I said in my initial remarks, I believe that how this question is ultimately resolved will be the key determinant of success for many of the companies involved in today's broadband ecosystem and video industry.

I posed the question first to Peter Stern, who's in the middle of the action as Chief Strategy Officer of Time Warner Cable, the second largest cable company in the U.S. I thought his answer was intriguing: he said that it is cable networks themselves who will determine the sustainability of the model, depending on whether they choose to put their full-length programs online for free or not.

Later in the session, he put a finer point on his argument, saying that "a move to online distribution by cable networks would directly undermine the affiliate fees that are critical to creating great content" and that finding ways to offer these programs only to paying broadband Internet access subscribers was a far better model for today's cable networks and operators to pursue (for more see Todd Spangler's coverage at Multichannel News).

Peter's point echoes my recent "Cord-Cutters" post: to the extent that cable networks - which now attract over 50% of prime-time viewership, and derive a third or more of their total revenues from affiliate fees - withhold their most popular programs from online distribution, they provide a powerful firewall against cord-cutting. Speaking for myself for example, the prospect of missing AMC's "Mad Men" (not available online anywhere, at least not yet...) would be a powerful disincentive for me to yank out my Comcast boxes.

Still, our audience Q&A segment revealed some very basic cracks in the panelists' assertions that the transition to the broadband era can be orderly and managed (not to mention that afterwards, I was privately barraged by skeptical attendees). First and foremost these individuals argued the idea that the cable industry can maintain the value of its subscription service by using the control-oriented approach typified by the traditional windowing process flies in the face of valuable lessons learned by the music industry.

Of course most of us know that sorry story well by now: an assortment of entrenched, head-in-the-sand record labels forcing a margin rich, but speciously valued product (namely the full album or CD) on digitally empowered audiences, who decided to take matters into their own hands by stealing every song they could click their mouses on. Consequently, a white knight savior (Apple) offering a legitimate and consumer-friendly purchase alternative (iPod + iTunes), which would grew to be so popular that it has made the record labels beholden to it, while simultaneously hollowing out the last vestiges of the original album-oriented business model.

Does history repeat itself? Are Peter and the other brightest lights of the cable industry deluding themselves into thinking that a closed, high-margin, windowed platform like cable can ever possibly morph itself into a flexible, must-have service for today's YouTube/Facebook generation?

As Fred succinctly wrapped things up, "The reason I love capitalism is that it forces all of us to keep doing things better and better." To be sure, broadband and digital delivery are unleashing the most powerful capitalistic forces the video industry has yet seen. What impact these forces ultimately have on today's market participants is a question that only time will answer.

What do you think? Post a comment now!

I'll be off the grid for a while Monday morning, moderating the inaugural Broadband Video Leadership Breakfast here in Boston. We have a great group of panelists and attendance approaching 270 people. We'll be offering a full video replay of the session; as soon as it's available I'll post an update.

Three numbers in last week's third quarter Comcast earnings release underscored something I've believed for a while: Comcast is a company transformed, now reliant on business drivers that barely existed just ten short years ago. Comcast's transformation from a traditional, plain vanilla cable TV operator to a digital TV and broadband Internet access powerhouse is profound proof of how consumer behaviors' are changing and value is going to be created in the future.

That it doesn't any longer owes to the company's ability to bolster video services revenue and cash flow through ever-higher penetration of digital services into its remaining sub base (at the end of Q3 it stood at 69% or 16.8 million subs). Years after Comcast and other cable operators introduced "digital tiers," stocked with ever-more specialized channels that consumers resisted adopting, the industry has hit upon a winning formula for driving digital boxes into Americans' homes: layering on advanced services like HD, VOD and DVR that are only accessible with digital set top boxes and then bundling them with voice and broadband Internet service into "triple play" packages. Comcast has in effect gone "up-market," targeting consumers willing and able to afford a $100-$200/month bundle in order to enjoy the modern digital lifestyle.

Still, in a sense the new advanced video services represent just the latest in a continuum of improved video services. Far more impressive to me is the broadband growth that both Comcast and other cable operators have experienced. Comcast's approximately 15 million YE '08 broadband subscribers will generate almost $8 billion in annual revenue for Comcast, up dramatically from its modest days as part of @Home 10 years ago. (It's also worth noting the company now also provides phone service to over 6 million homes today vs. zero 10 years ago)

The cable industry as a whole will end 2008 with approximately 37 million broadband subs, again up from single digit millions 10 years ago. And note that the 387,000 net new broadband subs Comcast added in Q3 '08 compares with just 277,000 net broadband subs that the two largest telcos, AT&T and Verizon added in quarter, combined. As someone who was involved in the initial trials of broadband service at Continental Cablevision less than 15 years ago, observing this growth is nothing short of astounding.

While broadband's financial contribution to Comcast is unmistakable, its real impact on the company is more keenly felt in its newfound importance in its customers' lives. Broadband Internet access has become a true utility for many, as essential in many homes as heat, water and electricity. A senior cable equipment executive told me recently that research done by cable companies themselves has shown that in broadband households, broadband service would be considered the last service to get cut back in these tough economic times. In these homes cable TV itself - long thought to be recession-resistant - would get cut ahead of broadband.

Comcast is indeed a company transformed from what it was just 10 years ago. Technology, changing consumer behaviors and a little bit of "being in the right place at the right time" dumb luck have combined to allow Comcast to remake itself. Comcast itself must fully recognize these changes and aggressively build out Fancast and other initiatives to fully capitalize on its newfound opportunities.

What do you think? Post a comment now.

Over the past several months Netflix has made a series of announcements related to its "Watch Instantly" feature. On the device side, there are new partnerships with TiVo (for Series 3, HD and HD XL models), Microsoft Silverlight (for Mac viewing), Samsung (for Blu-ray players), LG (for Blu-ray players), Xbox 360 and of course Roku. All allow Netflix Watch Instantly content to be delivered directly to users' TVs. Meanwhile on the content side, there have been deals with Starz, CBS and Disney Channel, with more no doubt yet to come.

Our household has been an enthusiastic subscriber to Netflix for years and I welcome the commitment that Netflix appears to be making to Watch Instantly. However, as I pointed out in May, in "Online Movie Delivery Advances, Big Hurdles Still Loom," Watch Instantly is hobbled by its limited catalog, now totaling around 12,000 titles, just 10% of Netflix's total catalog, even after including the recently added Starz titles.

The fundamental problem Netflix is bumping up against in building out Watch Instantly's film catalog is Hollywood's well-established windowing process. Studios have wisely and methodically maximized their films' lifetime financial value by doling out the rights to air them to a series of distribution outlets. These rights unfold in a carefully calibrated timeline and have become wrapped up in a thick layer of contractual agreements extending to all parties in the value chain. It is a system that has served all constituencies well, generating billions of dollars of value. It is also unlikely to change in any material way any time soon.

As such, Netflix, the "world's largest online movie rental service," as it calls itself, is increasingly discordant. On the one hand, growing the Watch Instantly service is crucial to Netflix's long term success in the digital/broadband era but on the other, it doesn't have the ability to offer a competitive catalog that meets consumers' online delivery expectations. So what to do?

My recommendation is for Netflix to incorporate the delivery of TV programming, via Watch Instantly, into its core value proposition. Specifically, Netflix should be making an all-out effort (if it is not already doing so) to secure next-day rights to deliver all prime-time broadcast network programs to its subscribers.

This strategy provides Netflix with many clear benefits and positions it well for long-term success. First, in these tight economic times, it dramatically expands the value of the Watch Instantly feature, turning it into both a bona fide subscriber retention tool to battle churn as well as a high-profile subscriber acquisition lever (not to mention an exciting pull-through offer big box retailers could use in their Sunday circulars to generate traffic).

Second, it is a clever competitive strike against four primary alternative ways whereby consumers can watch network programs on demand: cable-based VOD, a la carte paid downloads at iTunes/Amazon/others, free online aggregators like Hulu/Fancast/others and DVRs (though note the TiVo deal addresses this last option).

A comprehensive Netflix prime-time catalog compares well with each alternative. Against cable VOD it offers familiar, superior navigation plus a viable revenue stream for broadcasters while cable tries to get Canoe ready; against paid downloads, the obvious advantage of being a value-add service; against online aggregators, commercial free delivery; and against DVRs, the lack of consumer hardware purchases and persistent recording space limitations.

All of this should make Netflix a very appealing partner for the broadcast networks. They are getting hammered by ad-skipping, audience fragmentation, quality programming migrating to cable and an inferior single revenue source business model. The prospect of Netflix offering payments for their programs should be well-received. There may be concerns about programs' long term syndication value and also the potential enablement of a new gatekeeper. In better times these might be deal-killers; in this climate they shouldn't be.

Finally, there's the big potential long-term Netflix prize: if it can stitch together a large-scale network of compatible devices for Watch Instantly distribution, it could create a viable "over-the-top" alternative to today's multichannel subscription services (cable/telco/satellite). As I described in my recent "Cord Cutters" post, to really succeed, Netflix would have to eventually incorporate cable network programming. But if its reach is wide and its economics sound, that's within the realm of possibility as well.

But those are long-term issues. For now, while the recent CBS deal is a great start, Netflix should be working double-time to build out a full library of broadcast programs. It would dramatically improve Watch Instantly's appeal and value, while positioning Netflix well for the broadband era.

What do you think? Post a comment now.

Periodically VideoNuze makes complimentary research available that is beneficial to our audience of broadband decision-makers.

Today I'm pleased to offer for complimentary download a handy one page digital media workflow "snapshot" created by Marketing Mechanics, a consulting and market intelligence firm run by Ellen Grace Henson. The snapshot identifies features and capabilities for over 20 broadband technology companies.

Ellen has been in and around the digital media industry for many years in product management and marketing roles and has lately consulted with Kontiki and Move Networks among others. She reached out recently to familiarize me with her work and to share the snapshot. Though she readily concedes the document is not meant to be comprehensive, it provides a very good framework for making sense of the crowded broadband landscape.

The ecosystem of companies supplying necessary products and services to content creators who want to capitalize on broadband's rise is complex and dynamic. I'm often asked for data and comparisons of industry vendors; I think the snapshot can begin to fill that role. It will no doubt evolve over time, as the industry changes and customer requirements grow.

The snapshot dates to when Ellen was consulting for Kontiki (when it was owned by VeriSign), but it was updated as of September 2008. Ellen pulled together the information by talking directly to the companies cited; by definition that means readers will need to carefully assess the data in the context of their own experience and knowledge.

Click here for complimentary download

It's been hard not to notice the recently growing roster of digital media/broadband video executives who are either leaving their jobs or jumping to other companies.

Among the many recent changes:

• Bill Day (moved to CEO, ScanScout from Chief Media Officer, Marchex)
• Ned Desmond (leaving as President, Time, Inc Interactive)
• Tony Fadell (leaving as SVP, iPod Division, Apple)
• Karin Gilford (moved to SVP, Fancast/Comcast from VP/GM, Yahoo Entertainment)
• Bob Greene (left as EVP, Advanced Services, Starz)
• Kevin Johnson (moved to CEO, Juniper Networks from President, Platforms & Services Division, Microsoft)
• George Kliavkoff (leaving as Chief Digital Officer, NBCU)
• Michael Mathieu (moved to CEO, YuMe from President, Freedom Communications Internet Division)
• Scott Moore (leaving as SVP, Media Group, Yahoo)
• Herb Scannell (moved from CEO to Executive Chairman, Next New Networks)
• David Verklin (moved to CEO, Canoe Ventures from CEO, Aegis Media Americas)

Of course there are many more as well.

There's no blanket explanation for all of this movement. Senior executives - particularly those with strong track records in unchartered territory like digital media and broadband video - are always in demand by competitors. And established companies who can't execute or who are losing altitude in their core businesses become fertile ground for executive recruiters. Then there are always personal reasons for causing executive change (family matters, geographic restrictions, etc.).

The whole digital media and broadband space is extremely dynamic. Major incumbents continue to struggle with defining their strategies and how to organize themselves properly to execute. The financial meltdown has caused huge profit pressure, prompting operational streamlining.